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. In placing the provincially-constituted statutory tribunal against the broader background of Canadian constitutional law, Crevier effectively disposes of any pretense to perfect the administrative solution to labour disputes through novel formulations of the privative clause 7 . The following postscript to the writer's article reflects briefly on the décision rendered and what it will mean for labour statutes committed to the administrative solution.
THE DECISION IN CREVIER
The Professions Tribunal established under the Québec Professional Code was granted powers to confirm, alter, or quash any décision by a discipline committee constituted under the Code. Included for thèse purposes were powers encompassing review of fact or law and jurisdiction, 8 the exercise of which was reinforced by a privative provision ousting judicial review 9 .
The Québec Court of Appeal availed itself of the usual construction placed on privative clauses and held 10 that the language employed did not contemplate foreclosing the Superior Court's review where there had been a want or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Professionals Tribunal. The Suprême Court disagreed. As a matter of ordinary construction, said Laskin C.J.C., « It is ironie that it was Professor Bora Laskin (as he then was) who once observed the «apparent futility» of the initial attempts in Canada to oust the court's jurisdiction over matters assigned to the labour board 20 . «In the face of such enactments», Laskin cautioned, «judicial persistence in exercising a reviewing power involves an arrogation of authority only on the basis of constitutional principle (and there is no such principle) or on the basis of some 'élite' theory of knowing what is best for ail concerned» (the paren- unequivocally affirming just such a principle. In 1952 he was adamant. «We must not...delude ourselves», he instructed, «that judicial review rests on any higher ground than that of being implicit in statutory interprétation»: 23 «We may well feel that judicial supremacy is the highest of ail values under a démocratie régime of law, and a value to which even the législature should pay tribute. But we hâve not enshrined it in any fundamental constitutional law or in our political System. On the contrary, the cardinal principle of our system of représen-tative government, inherited from Great Britain, has been the supremacy of the législature. In Canada this has been modified only through a distribution of législative power consonant with federalism and by a few guaranties such as those relating to éducation, language and the independence of the judiciary. We must not then delude ourselves...»
24
Perhaps the saving qualification in that quotation is Laskin's gênerai référence to Canada's distribution of législative power. But Laskin was at pains to dispel any suggestion that this, or any aspect of the Canadian constitutional setup, abridged his «cardinal principle» of législative supremacy for the spécifie purpose of enjoining judicial obédience to the privative clause. In addition to the above statement berating courts for their disobedience and disavowing any constitutional justification for their «per-sistence», 25 Laskin reiterated: «At the threshold of this inquiry it may be well to make the assertion that there is no constitutional principle on which courts can rest any claim to review administrative board décisions» 26 . Whilst he did concède that in constitutional matters involving the distribution of législative power judicial supremacy is «an accepted fact», 27 he concluded: «Yet the question remains why the courts, as one agency of government, should not respect the authority and responsibility of another agency, the législature, in matters where no issue of distribution of législative power arise» 28 .
The very minimum judicial office implies is independence of thought; even from one's own earlier views if necessary. Crevier bears witness. Yet it does not seem from Crevier that ivory tower conjecture is simply to be ig- nored with impunity, for Laskin C.J.C. saw fit to cite four publications 29 expressing, as his Honour himself put it, «académie concern with the permitted scope of the privative clause» 30 . Since thèse represent the spectrum of thought on the question, dating indeed from the time of his Honour's own publication, one wonders with respect whether it really would hâve been judicially improper for the Chief Justice to hâve included, amid the citations given, référence to his own critique.
AFTER CREVIER
There is little use now in pleading for judicial récognition of the législative policy underlying section 33 of the British Columbia Code 31 . In fact, on the strength of Crevier one must speculate whether those provisions of the Labour Code which emphatically prélude review even on jurisdictional grounds are any longer constitutionally valid. Can thèse reasonably be construed to préserve Superior Court supervision over the Board's jurisdiction? On the foregoing examination it is submitted not 32 .
Accordingly it seems that the sole focus now must be on the distinction between errors of law within jurisdiction and jurisdictional error: the former may be validly insulated from judicial review, the latter not. Herewith the British Columbia Board must be resigned to the freedom which the conceptualism of Anisminic 33 gives courts to gratuitously interfère in issues of labour relations policy more appropriately referred to the administrative agency; lest it be forgotten it was judicial enthusiasm for this freedom that caused British Columbia in 1973 to experiment with its novel method of foreclosing judicial intervention on grounds of jurisdiction. (Is it not also significant that in the two cases in which the Suprême Court has upheld the législature^ intent and ruled in favour of the privative clause precluding ail curial review, it has been for purposes of upholding the «sec-tion 96» challenge to the agency's jurisdiction? 34 ) On the other hand, perhaps there has been more cause for optimism exhibited recently in cases such as C. U.P.E. Local 963 v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation* 5 where the Suprême Court willingly deferred to the expertise of the Labour Relations Board in specialist matters confided to it. Perhaps this suggests that courts will not now interfère with Board décisions unless the error obviously goes to jurisdiction? But the fact remains that no matter how tolérant the courts or extensive the judicial goodwill, the déci-sion is nonetheless their's, the judges', to résolve what is jurisdictional and what is not. And history may well hâve it that this dépends as much on the state of the judge's indigestion as any légal considération.
COMMENT
In retrospect the balance of académie opinion in British Columbia prior to Crevier possibly supported the argument eventually upheld there, such that the «section 96» challenge to the British Columbia Board's jurisdiction may well hâve been more a question of «when» than «if». But whatever once was conjecture is now reality -henceforth the Code's provisions must be read subject to what this décision establishes for the provincially-constituted statutory body. On the other hand, the décision merits no spécial attention outside of Canada where the «section 96» problem does not arise and the sole issue is the appropriate drafting of an effective privative clause.
